Live evidence page

The security questionnaire, answered by the record

Every figure on this page is computed at request time from a tamper-evident, externally countersigned event chain — log admiral/prod. Nothing here asks for trust: the last section shows how to verify the record yourself, offline.

Coverage score
29/100
Events on the chain
2
Last external anchor
25h ago

The questionnaire rows

Do you maintain an audit trail of agent actions?

Yes — 2 events across 2 agent(s), hash-chained in an append-only store. The chain head is at sequence 2.

Can the audit trail be altered after the fact?

Any alteration is computable: each event carries the hash of the one before it; 1 of 1 signed checkpoints are countersigned by an independent RFC 3161 timestamp authority, and write-once (WORM) anchoring has not yet covered a checkpoint on this log — this sentence updates itself the moment one lands. Editing a stored event breaks verification at that exact sequence.

Is there a kill switch, and is its use itself recorded?

Yes — a tenant-level halt that wins over every other rule. Current state: armed, not engaged. Every flip is chained under the operator's name.

Are humans in the loop for high-impact actions?

Yes — "Moving more than the threshold requires a named human to approve first." (enforcing). 0 action(s) held for sign-off in this record; every grant or refusal is a chained event naming the reviewer.

Are out-of-bounds actions blocked, not just flagged?

Yes — deny-by-default evaluation runs before enforced actions execute; 0 action(s) blocked in this record, each carrying the rule id, version, and reasons.

Are adverse decisions about people recorded with reasons?

Yes — "A decision against a person must record why, in structured form." (enforcing). A decision against a person without a structured reason is refused.

Can you reconstruct an incident end-to-end?

Yes — events are strictly sequenced, and sessions and trace ids join related actions across capture planes (effect). Coverage score: 29/100, with its deductions stated below.

What happens to the evidence if the vendor disappears?

Nothing. The format is open, exports are self-contained, and the verifier runs offline with no account — the record stays independently checkable whether or not Auditant exists.

Stated limitations, in our own voice

A trust page that only says yes is marketing. These are the current deductions from the coverage score, published because an omission a reviewer finds later costs more than one we named first:

Verify it yourself

Request the evidence bundle for any window from the operator — a single JSON file carrying the events, the checkpoints, the public keys, and its own verifier. With nothing but Node.js:

node -e "const b=require('./bundle.json');require('fs').writeFileSync('verify.mjs',b.verifier)"
node verify.mjs ./bundle.json

The verifier recomputes every hash, re-links the chain, and validates each checkpoint signature and RFC 3161 countersignature. It names the exact sequence number at the first discrepancy. That property survives us: the format is open and the verifier needs neither our servers nor our permission.