Evidence packet

Tamper-evident record of AI agent activity · log tenant_acme/prod · generated 2026-08-19T21:59:32.546Z

Every figure in this packet is computed from a hash-chained, externally countersigned event record. Section 6 explains how to re-verify the chain yourself, offline, without an account with Auditant or with the operator. A packet whose numbers can only be checked by the party that produced it would be a claim; this one is checkable.

1 · The record

Reporting window: log genesis — 2026-08-19T21:59:32.546Z
Events on the chain: 52
Chain head: sequence 52, sha256:2fd953f5d4ab6fbad74de0c…
Distinct agents: 9
Actions blocked by policy: 4
Actions held for human sign-off: 0
Signed checkpoints: 7 (3 countersigned by an independent timestamp authority; 0 held in write-once Object Lock storage)
Coverage score: 74/100 — capture planes live: model, action, edge, effect

Stated limitations of this record (an honest packet names its own gaps):

newest external anchor is stale — the exposure window is open
1 agent quiet for over 24h — silence and a broken emitter look identical from here
2 of 4 traces observed on a single plane only — assertion, not corroboration
2 events carry cost the upstream did not price

2 · SEC 17a-4 / FINRA 3110 — supervision and records (in force today)

FINRA's 2026 Regulatory Oversight Report directs firms to track agent actions and decisions and to be able to reconstruct the full chain of activity. This record reconstructs that chain event-by-event: each action carries who acted (actor), under whose authority (onBehalfOf, approvedBy), what was checked (policy), and what happened (outcome).

Obligation	Where this record answers it
Records preserved in non-rewriteable, non-erasable form (17a-4(f))	Checkpoints are signed and RFC 3161-countersigned; write-once (WORM) anchoring has not yet covered a checkpoint in this window — this row is computed from the record and updates when it does.
Supervisory review evidence (3110)	Policy decisions are recorded on the acted event: rule id, version, reasons, and — where a human signed — the approver's identity and timestamp.
Reconstruct the sequence of automated activity	Events are strictly sequenced per log; sessions and traces join related actions across capture planes.

3 · EU AI Act Article 12 — automatic event recording (applies 2 Dec 2027)

Article 12(1) requires that high-risk systems "technically allow for the automatic recording of events (logs) over the lifetime of the system". Article 12(3) names specific data for biometric-adjacent systems; this schema carries those fields by name for every agent type:

Art 12 requirement	Schema field	Status in this record
Period of each use (session start/end)	art12.periodStart / art12.periodEnd on lifecycle events	present
Inputs leading to the result	inputHash on every recorded action (payloads under the operator's custody)	present
Humans involved in verification	art12.humansInvolved plus approvedBy on human_override events	present
Automatic recording over the system lifetime	52 events, appended at action time, never editable	present

Retention: the record is append-only and its anchors are write-once; nothing in the pipeline deletes on a debugging schedule. (Article 19's six-month minimum is exceeded by construction.)

4 · Colorado SB 26-189 — consequential decisions (effective 1 Jan 2027)

Obligation	Where this record answers it
Compliance records retained ≥ 3 years	Append-only chain with WORM-anchored checkpoints; retention is a property of the store, not a configurable cleanup job.
Adverse decisions carry a stated reason	Policy `adverse-decision-requires-reason` is enforcing: a decision against a person without a structured reason is refused, and the refusal is chained.
Meaningful human review on request	Every pending_approval / human_override pair is a chained review record naming the reviewer and their answer — grant or refusal.

5 · Insurance underwriting — AIUC-1 control evidence

AI-agent liability underwriters condition coverage on governance evidence and price premiums against it. The six controls underwriters cluster on, and what this record shows for each:

Underwriter control	Evidence in this record
Documented human kill switch	Tenant-level halt, forbid-wins over every other rule; each flip is chained under the operator's name. Currently: armed, not engaged.
Human-in-the-loop inventory	"Moving more than the threshold requires a named human to approve first." — enforcing. 0 action(s) held for sign-off in this record; every grant and refusal is a chained `human_override` event naming the reviewer.
Enforcement evidence on the existing stack	4 action(s) blocked by policy in this record, each with the rule id, version, and stated reasons on the event itself.
Agent scope restriction	"An agent may only use the tools it was explicitly granted." — deny-by-default; out-of-grant attempts are blocked and chained.
Runaway-spend and loop guards	"An agent that exceeds its daily ceiling or loops too long is stopped." — spend ceilings and iteration caps evaluated before the action executes.
Tamper-evident activity record	52 events, hash-chained; 7 signed checkpoints, 3 countersigned by an independent RFC 3161 timestamp authority.

6 · Verify this record yourself

Request the evidence bundle for the same window — a single JSON file carrying the events, checkpoints, public keys, and its own dependency-free verifier. On your own machine, with no network, no account, and nothing installed beyond Node.js:

node -e "const b=require('./bundle.json');require('fs').writeFileSync('verify.mjs',b.verifier)"
node verify.mjs ./bundle.json

The verifier recomputes every event hash, re-links the chain, checks each checkpoint signature against the public keys below, and validates the RFC 3161 countersignatures. It exits non-zero and names the exact sequence number at the first discrepancy. Tampering with any stored event — by the operator, by the vendor, by anyone — is computable from the bundle alone.

Public key attestable-b25066d53d5b:

-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEv0tDQUUkvHF3JxnnLIyEHkf07Oec
IoIVlZKGUWx4jjRlZoTldm+uHkj0Pnuz5eYfX0RxLYazYbqA125+nRLGuA==
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----

Public key attestable-5645354b28b7:

-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEvpCIhQnkjwifnTlq/hZ7Di4S+HWQ
VaqGcZWnASFBglCQ57QQO+WJ4igigZCEyb6F6orPGM8HapvryWYCLb0sZA==
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----

Public key attestable-1f22611c5644:

-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEGQLzqbrtEr3CnqEdg0q99sTfxp0I
NQuZ+dKbjFMSlPPIp5BoLpH6fS7/7GF7dANizE6N1kn+EmkSDD6vJllcNQ==
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----

Public key attestable-54085e8a8656:

-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEWuRChW10ezibHdsRndd0SCuCiQpy
T4udJB0B4VlcDsDIif3MI1mGL4NSNeSK+LeBUU+iI20rfDmZlfmz6EHuvw==
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----

Public key attestable-28e4bfbbdc22:

-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE9hhlUY+YpfzMfI/uinNCtBdiMUkV
GmWwEHV2ppUiZuO0YmKJaQGsEOI7BOy3g6N6QC7519zigSQXL1IcumKC8A==
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----

Public key attestable-9e793a94bbf8:

-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEnbtWUuB/A/rN0djY8SS2WWaQnmZ+
crUr0SfleT3G0fnCuQB6yXLUPJe4kYPoZ+FiT5ZkSlcxdXqS0J2u3uAkUA==
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----

Public key attestable-055ccb166437:

-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEEFp7gqFdTB71u53ZM0vO77otPpHy
fLr+yfLL+aFtl0TWx/jyNUJMpzY8jMPAOrLGPJrX1The7nKhNgjXJ+mNbA==
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----

Public key attestable-ec90224cbe71:

-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEEhV4Us5fev02Qgh1lJDMtfl+uWrn
/CfJDLJTY4JyVx1xNw4q5hxPkuKrzGwXCp3h0h6CLM4O3rPUkGuyQRMmKQ==
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----

Public key auditant-ec90224cbe71:

-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEEhV4Us5fev02Qgh1lJDMtfl+uWrn
/CfJDLJTY4JyVx1xNw4q5hxPkuKrzGwXCp3h0h6CLM4O3rPUkGuyQRMmKQ==
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----

Public key auditant-f8c74da45461:

-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE0KIFTEBE+CNXKJq+P30q6BZkAhVG
T6uS3k2if1y5kkA/0fds18yNmw6kN+UOGa8zRMD45n5wWeU74L57zZ4Ljw==
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----